price that reflects the participation of each individual in the market. The sorts of phenomena we study are different as these describe ways to formalize ideas such as peer group influences, whereby behaviors of one agent alter the preferences of others and are not mediated by how individuals affect prices in a market equilibrium. As such, social interactions constitute an example of the type of externalities described in Arrow and Hahn (1971, chapter 6 , section 2).
Within economics, there has developed an increasing recognition that social interactions may play a major role in explaining a range of individual behaviors. In many respects, the new literature on social interactions addresses a famous criticism of economics made in Granovetter (1985) , "Classical and neoclassical economics operates…with an atomized and undersocialized conception of human action…The theoretical arguments disallow by hypothesis any impact of social structure and social relations…" (pg. 55)
In fact, one of the appealing aspects of the new literature on social interactions is that it has facilitated the introduction of sociological concepts and perspectives into economic modeling. In turn, the economics literature on social interactions has shown how these ideas may be formalized and extended using the formal rigor of economic theory. More important, the approach we take represents a first step in an integration of individual-based and social-based explanations, a perspective whose importance is well described in Arrow (1994) "It is clear that the individualist perspective does play an essential role in understanding social phenomena. Particularly striking is the emergent nature of social phenomena, which may be very far from the motives of the individual interactions. " (pg. 3)
As such, we regard the social interactions literature as a successful example of how social science benefits from the breaking down of disciplinary barriers.
There is now a large body of theoretical and empirical studies of social interactions. In terms of theory, two main approaches have been taken. One strand of the social interactions literature has focused on the implications of social interactions in predetermined groups. Akerlof (1997) and Brock and Durlauf (1999,2001a,b) , for example, consider the role of the interactions structure within a group on group-level outcomes. Models such as Loury (1977) and Lundberg and Startz (1998) focus on the effects of social interactions within ethnic groups with specific attention to how differences in initial conditions have long run effects. In contrast, work by Bénabou (1993 Bénabou ( ,1996 , Durlauf (1996a,b) and Hoff and Sen (2000) has primarily focused on the implications of social interactions for group formation, specifically in the context of residential neighborhoods. In these models, children are influenced by the neighborhoods in which they grow up through factors such as the local tax base, the types of role models that are present and via peer group influences. Models of this type can produce poverty traps as poverty among parents is transmitted to children when children are consigned to neighborhoods whose interactions adversely affect their subsequent economic status; poverty among parents, because of its effect on children's neighborhoods, thus transmits economic status across generations.
One limitation of the existing theoretical models of social interactions is the relatively weak connections between these two approaches.
2
The empirical literature on social interactions has been dominated by attention to the effects of residential neighborhoods. A wide range of analyses have produced regression evidence that links individual outcomes with neighborhood (i.e. groups defined by geographic proximity) characteristics; examples include Aizer and Currie (2002) , Brooks-Gunn et al (1993) , Corcoran et al (1992) , Brewster (1994) , Datcher (1982) , Ginther, Haveman and Wolfe (2000) , Ioannides and Zabel, (2002a,b) , Nigmatullin (2002) , Plotnik and Hoffman (1999), Sirakaya (2002) , South and Baumer (2000) , and South and Crowder (1999) . Alternative strategies for uncovering neighborhood effects using aggregated data have been developed by Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) and Topa (2001) . In addition, there is now a literature that moves beyond the assumption that geographic proximity determines interactions and attempts to identify which sorts of groups in fact produce social interactions. Aizer and Currie (2002) and Conley and Topa (2002) are interesting empirical analyses that compare alternative groups (e.g. groups defined by geographic proximity versus common ethnicity) in terms of the social interactions with which they are associated.
Empirical work on neighborhood effects has been buttressed by two recent developments.
The first is the use of "quasi-experimental" data produced by government interventions that alter the neighborhood choices of certain families. Examples of such programs include the Gautreaux program (Rosenbaum (1995) and Rosenbaum and Popkin (1991) ) and the Moving to Opportunity Demonstration (Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) , Ludwig, Duncan and Hirshfeld (2001) ). Each of these programs is interesting because each constitutes a government intervention in which a set of poor families are given incentives to move to more affluent neighborhoods, thereby permitting comparison with similar families who did not receive such incentives. These studies generally find improved outcomes, especially for children, among families that move.
The second is the development of a detailed data set that measures attitudes and beliefs across neighborhoods, called the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods.
As illustrated in Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999) and Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997) , this data can illuminate some of the structural relationships that underlie the correlations that are found in other studies between neighborhood attributes and individual outcomes. For example, these studies find that "collective efficacy," by which they mean the willingness of neighborhood members to provide public goods that contribute to social order (one example is monitoring the children of neighbors) appears strongly associated with lower crime rates.
A major weakness of the social interactions literature as it is currently constituted is the absence of strong connections between theory and empirics. By this, we mean that there has been little effort to employ theoretical models of social interactions in structural estimation. Our previous work on social interactions, Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) has attempted to address this limitation by developing models of binary choice that are directly econometrically implementable. This paper extends that work to account for multinomial choice. This generalization leads to a number of new methodological insights as well as allows for the application of theoretical models of social interactions to a broader range of phenomena than was previously possible.
Section I outlines a basic choice model with social interactions. Section II analyzes a version of this general framework in which individual choices follow a multinomial logit structure. Section III considers the econometric implementation of the multinomial logit model we have developed with specific attention to identification problems that may arise when social interactions are present. Section IV discusses how to extend our basic framework to account for alternative error specifications. We show that the basic theoretical and econometric features of the multinomial logit model apply quite generally. Section V considers how to integrate decisions on behaviors with decisions on group memberships. Section VI contains summary and conclusions. A Technical Appendix contains all proofs.
I. Modeling social interactions
We consider I individuals who are members of a common group . Our objective is to probabilistically describe the individual choices of each i, µ ω , the subjective beliefs individual i possesses about behaviors in the group, expressed as a probability measure over those behaviors.
Each of these components will be treated as a distinct argument in the payoff function that determines individual choices. As we shall see, each plays a distinct role in the analysis. 
,
where the right hand of this equation is the objective conditional probability measure generated by the model; self-consistency is equivalent to rational expectations in the usual sense. From the perspective of modeling individual behaviors, it is typically assumed that agents do not account for the effect of their choices on the decisions of others via expectations formation. In this sense, this framework embodies an expectations-based version of a Nash equilibrium.
This general structure illustrates how social interactions models preserve the individual choice-based logic of microeconomics. Their novelty lies in the interdependences in choices that are induced by including
µ ω as an argument in individual payoffs and imposing selfconsistency. From the perspective of economic theory, the interesting properties of these models emerge as a result of this interdependence.
II. A multinomial logit approach to social interactions i. basic setup
In order to understand the implications of social interactions for the equilibrium distribution of choices within a population, it is necessary to specialize this general behavioral description. We do this in three steps.
First, we assume that each agent faces a common choice set with discrete possibilities, i.e.
. The common choice set assumption is without loss of generality, since if agents face different choice sets, one can always assume their union is the common set and then specify that certain choices have payoff of −∞ for certain agents.
Second, we assume that each choice l produces utility for i according to:
Following the notation of the previous section, denotes the deterministic private utility agent receives from the choice, denotes the social utility from the choice, and p . This is the natural generalization of the conformity effect model developed in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) and is also employed in Bayer and Timmins (2001) .
Third, we assume that the errors , 
where γ is Euler's constant. This assumption is of course standard in the discrete choice literature and is the basis of multinomial logit specifications; see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for discussion of the substantive behavioral restrictions that this specification imposes.
The parameter β measures the dispersion in the random utility terms; higher β implies lower dispersion.
These assumptions may be combined to produce a full description of the choice probabilities for each individual, ( 
This is a standard calculation under the double exponential assumption for the random payoff terms and leads to the canonical multinomial logit probability structure (cf. Anderson, dePalma and Thisse (1992, section 2.6)): 
When there are only two choices, this is the model studied in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) .
Since the random payoff terms are independent across agents, the joint choice probabilities may be written as ( 
Finally, we characterize self-consistency as defined by eq. (2). We assume that the information set of each agent includes both the empirical distribution of deterministic payoff terms across choices and agents as well as the probability distribution from which random utility terms are drawn. We also assume that the number of agents is sufficiently large that each agent ignores the effect of his own choice on the average. 
where is the empirical probability distribution for the vector of deterministic terms h . It is straightforward to verify that under the Brouwer fixed point theorem, at least one such fixed point exists, so this model always has at least one equilibrium set of self-consistent aggregate choice probabilities. To see why this is so, observe that for any pair of choices and l l ′ for which the aggregate choice probabilities are nonzero, it must be the case that
for any J β . This follows from the fact that each agent is ex ante identical. Thus, it is immediate that any set of equilibrium probabilities that are bounded away from 0 will become equal as J β ⇒ ∞ . This condition is necessary as well as sufficient, so any configuration such that Hence, for the case where
configurations. Recalling that β indexes the density of random utility and measures the strength of interdependence between decisions, this case, when contrasted with
illustrates why the strength of these interdependences and the degree of heterogeneity in random utility interact to determine the number of equilibria.
These extreme cases may be refined to produce a more precise characterization of the relationship between the number of equilibria and the value of J . In general, this relationship is highly complex as it is necessary to account for the distribution of h across i and within a given group in order to develop precise statements as to how the model parameters determine the number of equilibria. Theorem 1 characterizes how the magnitude of l determines the number of equilibria in this case. 
When
, this theorem reduces to the characterization of multiple equilibria with binary choices in Brock and Durlauf (2001a) .
In general, it is difficult to extend Theorem 1 to account for cases where is nonconstant. The reason for this is that the equilibrium aggregate choice probabilities induced by the interaction of private incentives and social incentives will in general depend on the complete distribution of across choices and individuals. There are some special cases where one can establish precise results. For example, suppose that
− . In this case, the private deterministic utility of choice 0 differs from that of the other choices. In this case, the proof of Proposition ii in Brock and Durlauf (2001b) 
there exists a threshold T for such that if 0 there are multiple equilibria whereas if the equilibrium is unique.
There is a common basic intuition for Theorem 1 and similar results in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) that relate the number of choice equilibria to the interplay between the strength of social utility, J, the levels of deterministic private payoffs, , and the parameter that indexes the degree of dispersion in random private utility, An interesting feature of Theorem 1 is the fact that the condition for multiple equilibria depends on the number of choices. As such, the theorem explains simulation evidence in Bayer and Timmins (2001) which indicated that multiple equilibria seem less likely in models when more choices are involved. This theorem makes their findings precise and provides some insight as to why they occur. Intuitively, the reason that the number of choices raises the threshold value of J β necessary for multiple equilibria is the assumption that the random utility terms are independent. This independence means that the percentage of individuals in a population whose behavior is determined by their random utility (because of an extremely large draw for one of the choices relative to the others) increases in the number of choices, leaving a smaller percentage of the population susceptible to self-consistent bunching due to the influence of . Higher percentages of agents whose behavior is determined by the random utility draws will reduce the potential for social utility to produce multiple self-consistent equilibria. Brock (1993) and subsequently elaborated in the present context in Brock and Durlauf (2001a) , Brock and Durlauf (2002) proposed a way of formulating the behavior of a particular benign social planner (i.e. one whose objective function includes the sum of the deterministic payoff components of the individual agents) in such a way that the social planner's choice of configuration ω is given by a probability measure ( )
In this expression, I Z is a normalization and theˆl p 's are the empirical percentages of choices in the group, i.e.
( )
where 1 denotes the indicator function for the choice of by agent .
In comparison with the probability measure that characterizes choices for noncooperative equilibrium (eq. (7)), the important difference is that the social planner's problem uses empirical probabilities in modeling the interdependence of individual choices whereas the noncooperative equilibrium is based on population probabilities (i.e. the agents' rational expectations concerning the choices of others.) This difference is to be expected since a planner will account for how the choices of one actor affect others in ways that are ruled out in the noncooperative case. This feature makes the probability structure much more difficult to analyze. For example, the joint probability measure for the planner does not factor into a product of marginal probabilities (each 
The Brock and Durlauf (2002) assertion (their equation (12)) that (12) Although the usual central limit theorem results hold as long as 1) the value of J β does not equal the critical value around which multiple equilibria emerge and 2) is constant (Ellis (1985, Theorem V.9 .4)), the situation changes when the variance of is positive even when the global maximum of (10) is unique and various regularity conditions are imposed (Amaro de Matos and Perez (1991, Theorem 2.8, (a))). More precisely, the appropriately normalized sum of deviations around the mean will converge to a mixture of normals, not a normal distribution as occurs in standard cases. Further, small changes in the distribution of h can lead to large differences in the global maximum of (12).
We do not know whether a result such as (12) holds 
We will pursue a full analysis of (12) in subsequent work.
III. Econometric implementation i. Basic framework
An important feature of the theoretical framework is that it can also be used for econometric analysis. 5 The multinomial logit property for the individual choices allows one to construct a likelihood function for data taken for I individuals who are sampled across groups.
Since a typical data set will contain observations on individuals in different groups, we generalize our notation so that denotes the group of agent i ; Manski (1993) provides the first formal discussion of this dichotomy, which is irrelevant to the development of the theory of social interactions but has important implications for econometric analysis. Operationally, it is standard to assume
There is no necessary reason why the same elements of i X and ( ) 
exp 1
where I Z is the normalization
and beliefs are subject to a set of constraints on the subjective beliefs for members of each group
where ( ) g i X F is the empirical distribution of i X within group and expectations are formed on the basis of the probabilities defined by (15). This set of constraints imposes self-consistency in expected choice probabilities across groups and choices in the way that corresponds to the analysis in Section II.
( ) g i
As is standard for multinomial logit models, the complete set of model parameters is not identified. It is therefore necessary to impose some normalizations; we follow McFadden (1984 McFadden ( , p. 1413 
ii. identification
As originally recognized and analyzed in Manski (1993) . Specifically, Manski (1993) shows how for a class of linear models of group effects, collinearity between particular contextual effects and endogenous effects (in our context, the ( ),
consistent beliefs about aspects of behaviors in the group can induce nonidentification.
However, in contrast to the linear case, identification can hold for our model, as described in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Identification of the multinomial choice model with neighborhood effects
Let the true data generating process be given by (14)- (16) Then the true set of model parameters ( )
The proof of this theorem may be found in the appendix and is a generalization of a theorem on identification of neighborhood effects for binary choices found in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b (14) and (15) with
For (17) and (18), is a vector ( and represents the weights, conditional on choice l that agent i assigns to the percentage of the population making each of the choices;
p is the vector of expected choice percentages. Such a generalization is also appealing in various contexts. Suppose one is making a choice of religious affiliation in a population. It might be the case that the adherence to one affiliation is affected by the percentages of the population that adhere to certain other denominations For example, adherence to a particular affiliation that believes in creationism may be affected by the percentage of adherents to other Christian denominations that possess similar beliefs. 6 This generalization is also interesting because it allows for the possibility that there is negative social utility associated with particular crosschoice effects. 7 Hence, the expected percentage of the population making one choice can negatively affect the payoff for other choices. To extend our earlier example, this would allow for the expected percentage of religious believers in a population to reduce the payoffs associated with agnosticism or atheism, whereas no cross-choice effects exist between these two possibilities.
The conditions for identification for the model defined by (17) and (18) with expectations described by (16) is very similar to that of Theorem 2. Formally, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Identification for generalized multinomial logit model with social interactions
Suppose that individual choice is described by eq. (17) with self-consistent beliefs defined by eq.
(16). Denote 
is identified relative to any distinct alternative.
Intuitively, the additional condition in the Corollary adds sufficient variability in aggregate choice probabilities to allow for identification of the individual elements of . This additional variability allows us to mimic the proof of Theorem 2 and apply it to Corollary 1 as shown in the Technical Appendix.
l J
Finally, it is worth noting that the multinomial and binary choice models contain an interesting difference with respect to the presence of zero restrictions on the model parameters.
Unlike the binary choice model, for the multinomial choice model there may be zero restrictions on particular elements of that apply to one choice but not another. This means, for example, that a variable that is relevant for two of the choices may be known to be irrelevant for the others. However, since choices are determined by payoff maximization as in (1), the absence of a regressor in the payoff for a given possibility does not mean that it is irrelevant to whether that possibility is chosen. This reasoning suggests that there may be ways to employ regressors that are omitted from given choice-specific payoffs to identify those choice parameters. This may , , ,
In the previous models we have analyzed, and are allowed to take on negative values, but no cross-choice effects are present. also prove to be a route for finding choice-specific instrumental variables as needed in various forms of the model.
IV. Multinomial choice under alternative error assumptions
The basic logic of the multinomial model is straightforward to generalize. This can be seen if one considers the preference structure 1 , , ,
This is the same preference structure we worked with earlier, except that β is now explicitly used to index the intensity of choice (in the McFadden sense) rather than as a parameter of the distribution of the random payoff term , i l ε . We assume that these unobserved utility terms are independent and identically distributed with a common distribution function .
For this model, the probability that agent makes choice is
,...,
Following Anderson, dePalma, and Thisse (1992, pg. 36) , conditional on a realization of , i l ε , the probability that is chosen is l
, ,
which immediately implies that the probability of the choice l without conditioning on the
Eq. (22) provides a multinomial choice model whose structure is fully analogous to the multinomial logit structure developed in Sections II and III. Under self-consistency, the aggregate choice probabilities of this general multinomial choice model are the solutions to
As in the multinomial logit case, the compound parameter J β plays a critical role in determining the number of self-consistent equilibrium choice probabilities l p . This finding is formalized in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Uniqueness versus multiplicity of self-consistent equilibria in multinomial choice models
Suppose that individual choices and associated self-consistent equilibria are described by (22) and ( The relationship between J β and the number of equilibria is less precise than was found in Theorem 1, the multinomial logit case, as Theorem 3 does not specify anything about the way in which , the number of available choices, affects the number of equilibria. This lack of precision is to be expected since we did not specify the distribution of the errors.
L
One can also develop an analog to the identification results we have obtained for the multinomial logit model. We will work with the same normalizations as used in the multinomial logit case and will again assume that , 
into itself. Assume that this mapping is globally one-to-one. This is a "high level" assumption in the sense that it is an assumption that is imposed on the choice probabilities; ideally it is preferable to place assumptions on the payoff function and show that such a condition holds.
However, for our purposes, the assumption should not be regarded as too extreme as it holds for standard cases such as the multinomial logit.
Global invertibility provides a route to identification. Recall that nonidentification means that there exist two sets of parameters that produce the same choice probabilities , i l p and hence the same choice probability differences ,
. It is immediate that this invariance requires that if there exist two distinct sets of parameters ( )
( 1 1 1 1
) that are observationally equivalent in the sense that the individuals choice probabilities they induce are equal, that
Eq. (25) is the same condition that was analyzed in the proof of Theorem 2 (compare with (A.7)
in the Technical Appendix). The proof of Theorem 2 can therefore be adapted step by step to this case, allowing us to state Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. General parametric identification for the multinomial choice model
Let the true data generating process be given by (17)- (21) ( 1 1 1 1
Taken together, Theorems 3 and 4 show that our basic analysis of social interactions using the multinomial logit model are not driven by the specific random payoff distribution that is assumed but rather stem from the underlying logic of the model.
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V. Group choice and behavior choice
Our analysis so far has treated groups as predetermined. For contexts such as ethnicity or gender this is presumably appropriate. However, in other contexts, such as residential neighborhoods, group memberships are themselves presumably influenced by the presence of social interactions effects. Hence a complete model of the role of social interactions on individual and group outcomes requires a joint description of both the process by which groups are formed and the subsequent behaviors they induce. As yet, the literature on social interactions has not fully developed this joint approach. In particular, analyses such as Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) and Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) that focus on the micro structure of social interactions using interacting particle systems methods, have treated the interaction structures under study as exogenous. In contrast, models such as Bénabou (1993 Bénabou ( ,1996 and Durlauf (1996a,b) that have focused on the determinants of groups (in both cases neighborhoods) have been less concerned with the modeling of the structure of social interactions.
Further, the failure to account for the way groups form may have important econometric implications. As discussed in Brock and Durlauf (2001b) , and Manski (2000) and Moffitt (2001) , endogenous neighborhood choice has important implications for econometric implementation of models of neighborhood effects. Yet endogeneity of neighborhood memberships need not be an impediment to identifying neighborhood effects. Brock and Durlauf (2001b) in fact show, that self-selection into neighborhoods, when correctly specified, 8 One limitation of Theorem 3 is that it assumes that the distribution function F ε is known. We are currently exploring identification in the case where F ε is unknown.
can facilitate identification via the creation of additional determinants of individual behavior in linear models and/or by inducing nonlinearities in individual behavior, each of which eliminates possible collinearity between contextual effects and endogenous effects.
In this section, we outline two approaches for the integration of group determination and individual choice in the presence of social interactions. First, we consider the integration of group choices into a linear model of behavior. Second, we integrate group and behavioral choices into a common multinomial choice framework. 9 We will not derive these models from an explicit formulation of preferences as our goal is to characterize the probability structure of behavioral choices in the presence of endogenous group memberships.
i. linear in means models and endogenous group membership
One approach to integrating group choice and behavioral decisions may be developed by integrating group choice into a model in which the behavior obeys a linear model. Such models are quite common in the empirical literature on social interactions and have been studied by Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) , Manski (1993) , and Moffitt (2001) . Following the formulation in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) , behavioral choices i ω are continuous and are described by
Relative to the multinomial choice model of behaviors, a key difference in this specification is that the possible i ω values are ordered. Suppose that each individual assigns to each group an overall "quality" measure 9 Other approaches also appear promising in terms of understanding the interplay between social interactions and group formation for particular environments. For example, Ekelund, Heckman, and Nesheim (2001) show how prices associated with residential neighborhood memberships contain important information that may be used to uncover social interaction effects. Another important approach is due to Epple and Sieg (1999) who show how to develop implications for the distribution of families across communities in Tiebout-type environments. ν denotes an unobservable individual-specific quality term. Individual i is assumed to be a member of the group with the highest * , i g I . We assume that ( ) ν , ρ , are independent of group membership. This is more restrictive than the assumptions made in Lee (1983) ; we make this stronger assumption in order to avoid unnecessary complications.
The formulation we have described raises interesting econometric issues. Specifically, the model embodies two major issues that have been studied in the econometrics literature. Our goal in the subsequent discussion is to show how one can identify the parameters of the model we have described. The identification problem will be shown to revolve around the explicit incorporation of a self-selection correction into the behavioral equation (26). Heckman (1979) represents the seminal work in how to address the effects of this type of sample selection. Lee (1983) has developed an approach to dealing with self-selection that we employ here. We emphasize that our purpose is illustrative in that we demonstrate identifiability only under a particular set of parametric assumptions. However, the logic of our argument is more general than the case we study and can be adapted to alternative sets of assumptions. Also, it is important to note that Ioannides and Zabel (2002b) recognized previously that an argument in Brock and Durlauf (2001b) on the use of self-selection correction to achieve identification in models with two groups could be extended to multiple groups when group membership follows a multinomial logit framework. Our derivation differs from theirs in two respects. First, we employ an approach to selection correction developed by Lee (1983) rather than that due to Dubin and McFadden (1984) ; the relative merits of the two are discussed in Schmertmann (1994) and Vella (1998) . Second, we analyze how the nonlinearity of a selection correction affects identification. 10 We require two assumptions. First we assume , i g ν is double exponentially distributed as in eq. (4). Then, following Lee (1983, pg. 511, eq. (3.6) 
where relative to (4) parameter β is normalized to equal 1. This is the function that appears in These assumptions allow one to transform (26) in such a way as to produce a model that Following Lee (1983, pg. 511, eq. (3.7) ), whose analysis extends the argument that underlies Heckman (1979) , one may rewrite (26) as 10 One may also consider issues raised by unobservables which do not involve selfselection for the linear-in-means model. For example, Graham and Hahn (2003) study a version of (26) where is replaced by k g k . They explore alternative GMM and instrumental variables methods to identify the parameters of (26). Brock and Durlauf (2001b) discuss routes to identification that, for example, use differencing within groups to eliminate g k for this context.
The function . Brock and Durlauf (2001b, Theorem 7) show that nonlinear in means models of this type are locally identified, except for "hairline" cases. 11 The condition is necessary, rather than sufficient, but the presence of the variable breaks the necessary linear dependence of ( ) This argument thus generalizes the analysis of identification and self-selection found in Brock and Durlauf (2001b, pp. 3328-3331) . The key message for empirical work is that selfselection, if properly accounted for, can facilitate the identification of social interactions.
ii. a nested choice approach to integration behaviors and group memberships
A second approach to endogenizing group memberships may be developed using the nested logit framework originated by Ben Akiva (1973) and McFadden (1978) . The basic idea of this framework is the following. An individual is assumed to make a joint decision of a group and a behavior . We will denote the group choice of as {0,.
The structure of this joint decision is nested in the sense that the choices are assumed to have a structure that allows one to decompose the decisions as occurring in two stages: first, the group is chosen and then the behavior.
The key feature of this type of model is the assumption that choices at each stage obey a multinomial logit probability structure. For the behavioral choice, this means that
which is the same behavioral specification as (6). Group choices are somewhat more complicated. In the nested logit model, group choices are assumed to obey 12 While this nonlinearity argument holds in principle, a common concern in empirical work with selection corrections is the "quality" of the identification for the range of observed data when identification is based on a nonlinearity argument, cf. Vella (1998, pg. 135 
where (34) , , ,
with , , i l g ε independent and doubly exponentially distributed random variables across i and for a given . A standard result (e.g. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992, pg. 46) ) is that
Combining, (32)-(34), the joint group membership and behavior probabilities for an individual are thus described by ( ) 
This probabilistic description may be faulted in that (35) is not directly derived from a utility maximization problem. In fact, a number of papers have identified conditions under which (35) is consistent with utility maximization, cf. McFadden (1978) and Borsch-Supan (1990) for discussion. A simple condition (cf. Anderson, dePalma, and Thisse, 1992, pg. 48 ) that renders (35) compatible with a well posed utility maximization problem is g β β ≤ , which in essence requires that the dispersion of random payoff terms across groups is lower than the dispersion in random payoff terms across behavioral choices within a group.
There has yet to be any analysis of models such as (35) 
VI. Conclusions
This paper has described an approach to modeling social interactions that extends standard tools in the discrete choice literature, namely logit models of choice. The approach allows for the incorporation of a range of alternative types of social interactions into individual decisionmaking in a way that retains the logic of economic behavior while at the same time provides additional richness to the determinants of individual behavior. A virtue of the approach is that the theoretical model can be directly taken to data, both in the sense that the description of equilibrium choices is simultaneously a likelihood function and because the various group influences embedded in the model are identifiable under intuitive and reasonably weak
conditions. This has been demonstrated through the analysis of a leading case, namely, a multinomial logit version of the model. We have also shown that the qualitative theoretical and econometric features of our leading case, the multinomial logit model, also apply to alternative formulations of the random payoff process. Finally, we have illustrated how one can integrate choices about group memberships with choices on behaviors using a nested multinomial logit model.
More generally, we believe that there is wide scope for the better integration of sociological ideas and economic reasoning to provide a deeper understanding of the various phenomena that engage both disciplines. An important feature of the new social economics (Durlauf and Young (2001) ) is that it attempts to take account of phenomena ranging from crime to fertility to education where sociological factors would seem to play a key role. Economists have long understood the importance of addressing such factors. Arrow (1974) "It is a salutary check on any theory of the economy or any other part of society that the explanations make sense on the basis of the individuals involved." (pg.
3)
The theoretical and econometric approach we advocate is inspired by and attempts to implement Arrow's vision. It is easy to verify that ρ is a convexo-concave function with respect to its first argument. This means that as J L β becomes greater than 1, two new fixed points must emerge. This argument is sufficient to verify Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
This proof is a generalization of the proof for identification for a binary choice model in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) which in turns develops a mode of argument found in Manski (1988) . Suppose that for (
, the set of true parameters for the multinomial choice model, there exists another vector 
